Countryside Homeowner Association v. John Melehes and Iris Melehes : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1985
Countryside Homeowner Association v. John
Melehes and Iris Melehes : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Damian C. Smith; Snow, Christensen and Martineau.
John T. Caine; Richards, Caine and Richards.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Countryside Homeowner v. Melehes, No. 198520834.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1985).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/616
„CQWi*» 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTRYS1DE HOMEOWNER 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Non-
profit Corporation, 
Plaintiff/ 
Respondent 
Case No. 20834 
BR IE
F OF APPELLANTS 
vs 
JOHN MELEHES and IRIS 
MELEHES, 
Defendants/ 
Appellant5 • 
n p a l fro. the Judgment of the Third 
This is an appeal
 C o u n t y, 
. • i District Court in and for judicial Distric 
f Utah the Honorable John 
State of Utan, 
presiding• 
Ft 
OCT I t «85 
-Cfl 
SMITH DAMIAN C . b n n n
 M A R T l N E A U 
SNOW, CHRISTENStN
 n o o r 
°al
EtXLare9ecity Utah 84111 
SN 
1 
S 
JOHN T. CAINE 
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
IN THE SUPREME COURT IN THE STATE OF UTAI! 
COUNTRYSIDE HOMEOWNER 
ASSOCIATION, a Utdh Non-
profit Corporation, 
Plaintiff/ 
Respondent. 
vs. 
JOHN MELEHES and IRIS 
MELEHES, 
Defendants/ 
Appel lants. 
Cass No. 20834 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
This is an appeal from the Judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable John A. Rokich 
pres idi ng. 
DAMIAN C. SMITH 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 9th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JOHN T. CAINE 
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
STFTFF^NT nr TMF FA,;" F 
5UFMAFY OF THE ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT. ...... 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Gadd v. ci ..•,.•:,, . . . . 
McBride v. Jones, 61r, F.zd 43? (FtoF Fr -
System Concept: , It - ". iL}J^Jzv 1A* ^2:211' ^ " P. 2d 
421 (Utah 1983)"!777'. . ." ~.".".'. .77777 
r
*TAIFTORY AUTFOPITY 
R u l o q M c ) of ^Fc ] • :_?: . r * --•--.: i r v r r ' n ^ l j r f i . . . . 
IK THE SUPPEMS COORT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTRYSIDE HOMEOWNER 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah non-profit BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
corporation, : 
Civil No. 20834 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
vs. : 
JOHN MELEHES and IRIS MELEHES, : 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether summary judgment was appropriate in a case where 
there were factual disputes concerning the interpretation of a 
declaration of covenants of a condominium project, and whether 
the evidence before the court consisting of a deposition of one 
party, the affidavits of two parties, and the memorandum of 
counsel was sufficient to demonstrate no issues of fact or law 
requisite to granting a motion for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In November of 1983, the defendants, John and Iris Melehes, 
purchased two condominium units in the Countryside Condominium 
Project from Harmer Lambert, Inc., a Utah corporation, as the 
developer. These condominiums were located in Salt Lake County 
at approximately 70 South and 6th East. Prior to their purchase, 
the defendants discussed with Harmer Lambert, through Rich Lloyd, 
their agent, the fact that they desired to use one of the units 
to operate an in-home computer billing service called Iris 
Medical. This service is a service in which the defendant Iris 
Melehes does computerized billings for physicians and other 
- ? -
medical practitioners m .ne area. Permission was given by the 
developers to the defendants to operate the computer in one unit 
prior to the signma oi any purchase agreements and prior to the 
defendants moving into the units in December of 1983. (See 
affidavit of defendant Iris Melehes attached to defendants 
response to motion for summary judgment. Record on appeal.) The 
developer even assisted in wiring one of the units so that it 
would be appropriately wired for a large computer. 
Following the defendants' entry into the condominium, and 
after a period of time had elapsed, the defendants were notified 
that pursuant to the Countryside Homeowners Agreement, (attached 
to plaintiff's complaint, record on appeal) a declaration of 
condominium covenants, that they were not allowed to operate a 
business and that they were interfering with parking and, in 
general, interfering with other tenants peaceful use of the 
premises. The defendants contested this but the parties were 
unable to resolve their differences and a lawsuit was initiated 
by the Homeowners Association in February of 1985. The 
defendants had lived in the unit for approximately 14 months at 
that time. 
Following the filing of the lawsuit, a deposition was taken 
of Iris Melehes, one of the defendants herein, which is part of 
the record on appeal, in which the defendant indicated that one 
of the units was being used to operate her computer billing 
service and that although individuals would come to the 
condominium, they were not living there but defendant did, in 
fact, live in the same unit where the computer was located. (See 
- J * . 
deposition p.23-25 and P"! ~ *.ntif t' s Memorandum for Sunnary 
Judgment, Record on Appeal, p.2-3) 
After taking the deposition of Iris Melehens, the plaintiff 
moved for summary judgment. It used the statements made in the 
deposition and the declaration of condominium covenants 
themselves as the basis that there was no dispute. An opposing 
memorandum was filed, along with an affidavit of Iris Melehes 
setting forth the understanding of the defendants at the time 
that they purchased the units. 
The court reviewed counsel's memorandum and affidavits and 
the pertinent parts of the deposition, and on July 2, 1985, Judg< 
John A. Rokich ruled that there were no contested issues of fact 
or law and that summary judgment was appropriate. This ruling, 
in effect, enjoined the defendants from operating their business 
from their condominium unit. (See injunction, attached hereto as 
the addendum) It is from that decision that the defendants 
appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion fo: 
summary judgment in that there were genuine issues of fact and 
law with respect to the defendants' claim in the case. The 
status of the record at the time of the summary judgment hearing 
contained only a deposition of one of the defendants and an 
affidavit, both of which set forth contested facts, facts which 
plaintiff contends are central to the resolution of the lawsuit. 
Therefore, the court was arbitrary in granting the summary 
judgment without further discovery and without allowing the case 
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to proceed on xt% * nerits. 
ARGUMENT 
This Court han long taken the position that any summary 
proceeding which is disposirive of a lawsuit should be viewed 
with great caution so that parties whose cause might have merit 
is not deprived of the right to access to the court for the 
enforcement of rights or to redress wrong. McBride v. Jones, 615 
P.2d 432 (Utah, 1980). Rule 56(c) of Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith with 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and 
admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any show that 
there are no genuine issues to any material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
This Court has recently said in the case of Gadd v. Olsen, 
685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984), that a motion for summary judgment can 
only be granted when there are no genuine issues as to any 
material fact and even assuming the facts as asserted by the 
party moved against to be true, that the party could not prevail 
in some other fashion. 
In this case, the plaintiff, as the Homeowners Association, 
has taken the position that the only governing document that is 
applicable to resolving the issue before the court is the 
declaration of condominium covenants and that any representations 
made to the defendants by the developer of the condominium 
project, are somehow merged in that document and are not 
appropriate as they are not written out in any other document. 
It is clear that in this case there are two separate 
transactions that must be resolved. The first is the transaction 
between the defendants and the original developer of the 
property, Harmer Lambert, Inc. Defendants contemporaneously with 
their response to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, also 
filed a motion to interplead a third party complaint against the 
developer and that motion was also granted by the court. These 
actionsf however, are not mutually exclusive. The lower court 
apparently believed that the allegations contained in defendants' 
answer and the defendant Iris Melehes' deposition and affidavit 
that were part of the file which the court considered at the time 
of the summary hearing, were insufficient to offset the actual 
verbage of the homeowners agreement itself. The court, however, 
did not find that all prior discussions between the parties had 
been merged into that agreement nor that the original developer 
and the Melehes were privy to the homeowners agreement at the 
time they consummated their transaction. 
In this case, plaintiff asks for rather severe injunctive 
relief. In essence, the court's order requires that the 
defendants either dismantel their computer and cease any 
operations therein or move from the premises. This is a harsh 
remedy and has the potential of jeopardizing a ten year business 
that defendants have built. This Court has consistently held 
that injunctive relief is an .extraordinary remedy and should not 
be lightly granted. System Concepts, Inc., v. Shirley M. Dixon, 
669 P.2d 421 (Utah 1983). That is clearly not the case here. 
The language of the Homeowner's agreement itself is also not 
dispositive of the issue in that defendants believe that a 
-6-
careful reading 01 the declaration creates doubt as to exactly 
what kinds cf activities are prohibited and at least raises a 
factual dispute as to the interpretation of the agreement. The 
operable language of paragraph seven states, in part, 
"that all units are intended to be used 
for residential housing are restricted to 
such use. No units shall be used, 
occupied or altered in violation of the 
law so as to detract from the appearance 
or value of any other unit or so as to 
create a nuisance or to interfere with 
the rights of any other unit owner or 
in a way which would result in an 
increased of any insurance covering the 
project as a whole." 
There is no specific prohibition against an in-home 
business. In the defendant Melehes' deposition, she testified 
that in the particular unit in question she would sleep there and 
use it as a residence, along with running her business. (See 
Record on Appeal, Deposition of Melehes p.6.) It would appear 
that the appropriate interpretation of this section would be that 
whether or not this particular in-home business can be maintained 
depends upon whether it violates the law or in some way 
interferes with other owners use of the premises or detracts from 
value. There was no allegation at the time of the summary 
judgment hearing that any municipal or county ordinance that had 
been violated and there were no allegations that the operation 
interfered with any others use or enjoyment of the premises or 
that it created a nuisance. The only allegation made by the 
plaintiff was that the condominium project was covered by the 
declaration and that that declaration, per se, prohibited a 
in-home business. Again, this is a disputed issue which should 
have been resolved in a trial on the merits. 
Defendants strongly assert that there was before the court 
insufficient evidentiary material to be able to rule that no 
factual or legal dispute existed and grant the summary judgment. 
In fact, the evidence that was before the court in the form of 
depositional testimony, affidavits and the memorandum that were 
submitted by both parties indicated that there were disputes 
concerning agreements made between the defendant and the third 
party developer as to the use of their unitf and secondly, the 
dispute concerning the interpretation of the operable language of 
the agreement as it applied to this particular situation. Given 
the presence of both of these disputes areas, there is simply no 
question that the court erred and abused it's discretion in 
granting summary judgment and the court1s decision should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment is not appropriate in this case. The court 
erred in finding such against the defendants as there were 
genuine issues of fact that were in dispute based on the status 
of the pleadings at the time. The court is not allowed to infer 
other facts which were not present. The court overreached in 
granting summary judgment and the defendants respectfully submits 
that the decision of the lower court be reversed and the case be 
allowed to proceed to trial on the/merits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisj^^tTtay o2/)ctober, 198L^ . 
gkSHVl T. CAINE 
Attorney for Defendants 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTRYSIDE HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah 
nonprofit corporation. 
Plaintiff, SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND INJUNCTION 
JOHN MELEHES and IRIS 
MELEHES, 
Civil No. C-85-1239 
Judge John A. Rokich 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was submitted to 
this Court on the basis of the record on July 2, 1985, by 
Stipulation of Counsel appearing herein and upon acquiescence 
of the .undersigned Court. 
Based on the memoranda and pleadings on file herein, and 
being duly advised in the premises, this Court hereby grants 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and hereby enjoins 
defendants from any further conduct of business within those 
condominium units in the Countryside Condominium complex, being 
more particularly those two units located at 637 East 6910 South, 
ADDENDUM 
Salt Lake City, Utah, and the unit: located adjacent thereto 
commonly referred to as the "office." 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this s-.1 day of August, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
' ' h i A \« ~, I 7 <^A-
JUDGE JOHN A . ROKICH 
ATTEST 1 
H. DIXON H|NL">{ rY/ 
Deputy Uisrk 
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